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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT BY STATUTE, 
PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT TO APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT 
COURT FROM A DECISION REVOKING HER BUSINESS 
LICENSE BY THE DEFENDANT BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS AND TRIAL DE NOVO THEREON. 
UPON TAKING AN APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT THE 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL DE NOVO. 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE HEARD THE QUESTION 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' ORDINANCE. 
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rTf>r;?.c.-jo•/•.•-?: 'io'\ C:AIQ -bscfov oriw
 esiLfI0oM TanoiasiminoO htm 
, „~ .-.,-,. . ,-• STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE •>:^.-v^i. . <;- f:.i* 
This action was brought by the Plaintiff/Appellant 
to establish that the proper procedure to obtain judicial 
review of action taken by the Salt Lake County Board of 
County Commissioners in license revocation matters is 
by way of appeal to district court and trial de novo thereon; 
and to challenge the constitutionality and validity of the 
Salt Lake County massage parlor ordinance, Sections 15-18-6, 
10 and 11/ Salt Lake County Ordinances. 
-'"The above action was initiated after the Plaintiff/ 
Appellant was accused of violations of the above mentioned 
county ordinances and hearing held before the Salt Lake 
County Commission;.-after which the Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners voted to revoke the business license of the 
Plaintiff/Appellantf lil : 
> •£ i P.. - n r<>
 f •> -T n M :- cr ^ .- r> -t ,. 
a
 n-f -^^DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -.- . . , ,::^ v.-.iu^  
_,
 f ,. The matter was first brought before the Third f-_ 
District Court, Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, In-••+ :c 
Case No. 229028, In which case the Judge ruled the BoarduoO 
of County Commissioners action was acting in excess of its 
jurisdiction when the Board of County Commissioners, which 
at time of hearing, consisted of only Commissioner Kutulas 
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and Commissioner McClure, who voted one for revocation 
and one against, and then let Commissioner Dunn, who had 
been absent from the hearing, vote for revocation after 
he returned and read minutes of the hearing. 
The second matter was brought as Case No. 230771 
after the Defendant Board of County Commissioners had a 
rehearing on the matter of revocation of the Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's business license and voted unanimously to 
revoke said license which action resulted in the Court 
grantint the Defendant/Respondents motion to dismiss the 
Plaintiff/Appellant's action which judgment is hereby 
appealed from. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
Court's dismissal of her complaint in Case No. 230771; 
declaration of her right to appeal action of the Board of 
County Commissioners to District Court with right to a 
trial de novo thereon; and remand to Third District Court 
of the question of the constitutionality of Salt Lake 
County Ordinance Sections 15-18-6,10 and 11. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That shortly before November 9, 197^, the Salt 
Lake County Board of County Commissioners passed an 
2 
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aiiiei idine^t t o ^ho County ? a Massage P a r l o r o rd ina r— ' ' -I t ; 
T i t l e IV, Charge*- ~l Q. " -M-nv •, h« ;nnj I I , wf)I<' 
own l.ri.n.i -van .. njcoiik- effective upon date of publication 
which was on the 9th day of Novprnhrr., lO'^ ii, 
• That on .,i 'ihi ' i-. M t h day of April, 1975,, 
hearing was had before the Board of1 Salt Lake County 
Commis si oners
 3 Ra .Iph Mc CI ure '.Thai rnia 11,, and Pe I e Ku till as , 
Commissi oner oresent; Commissioner William E. Dunn not 
l-_~ p ^ t ^ n f . " ' ^ j 1 j : r :nr :v tva.: ' ^ V t>5'^ • * -
* .'1 o C j n r w -, r i d t'-*-- <* PI i f , • , - >- r
 x j_ ^ l * ^ ^*_, r- p, *-> • r 
* om]i?3s i on- t> ; ;;:- • } ' t~hc-1^ " 4 ' " q * 
mi.'.ij^i >ner Mit^Lare voting" i"* v ~ *• cL!;.oL^o:ir jr 
fatui^* s vo^ in'" "i , . , -., * i "or- ' j r^ > l a t e : " • -°n 
t . : 'i IntiA I J ' , . I V 1 ^ . • ' ; " i m1 ," :>! J H O : ! • • > - v . S <• / 
o'" Lhe minuses (M * ^  * ' * * . ,r .• Ot-' a 
minute, J« - cni;:i^ •• i t ; ' A .-r^ -at i\ * 
'- ~- ' -^a ni.- iv^ r a J ^ -,wj; i.w vuoL nib * ' rjtion 
.5. . . .Appellant fj'.' --j -,r r* Oomr:°-'~~ -nd 
temporary restraining ordf* ^ ? ' ^ r ^ 
Complain* alleged * - ; ,n ., ->..- ! ]-J(-
•
 M
 -w - . f ^ornrrlss] on^r.s -.: >,uvr' win 
improper and null and void as not conforming to procedure 
outlined In the Defendant/Respondents own ordinances: 
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in her Second Cause of-Action, that the evidence adduced 
before the Board of County Commissioners did not support 
the findings and that the matters were set forth by way 
of appeal to the Third District Court from the Board of 
County Commissioners (hereinafter called Board) action; 
and in her Third Cause of Action, alleged the unconstitu-
tionality and invalidity of the Defendant/Respondents' 
ordinance and her right to declaratory relief therefrom. 
The Defendants/Respondents moved to dissolve 
the Plaintiff/AppellantTs Temporary Restraining Order 
and also moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant filed her memorandum of law in 
support of her right to an appeal to District Court and 
trial de novo thereon from the Board's action. 
After hearing argument in support of the 
Plaintiff's and the Defendants' positions the Court 
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to the 
Plaintiff's Second and Third Cause of Action, but denied 
the motion as to the First Cause of Action and found the 
Board's actions to be illegal and null and void. The 
Plaintiff filed notice of appeal to the Supreme Court 
on the dismissal of Cause of Actions No. 2 and No. 3-
On or about September 22, 1975, another hearing 
was held before the Defendant Board on the license 
revocation matter, the Board hearing testimony from two 
4 
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witnesses and the Plaintiff/Appellant. -The Board voted 
to revoke the license of the Plaintiff and issued its order 
so doing. 
The Plaintiff then filed her complaint as Case 
No. 230771* alleging again her right to an appeal to 
District Court and trial de novo on the license revocation 
matter; her need for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction to protect her from economic 
damage during the pendency of the proceedings; and the 
unconstitutionality and impropriety of the Defendants' 
Board's Ordinance. The Plaintiff obtained a temporary 
restraining order. 
After Plaintiff and Defendant filed memorandua 
of law the Court again heard argument and granted the 
Defendant Board's motion to dismiss as to all three of 
the Plaintiff's Causes of Action. 
The Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal and 
motion for preliminary injunction which the Court granted, 
enjoining the Defendants Board and the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff from arresting the Plaintiff or any of her 
employees for doing business without a license during 
the pendency of these proceedings. 
In December of 1975* Plaintiff tendered payment 
to the Salt Lake County License Department but was refused 
5 
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issuance of a business license for 1976. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT BY 
STATUTE, PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT TO APPEAL TO 
THE DISTRICT COURT FROM A DECISION REVOKING 
HER BUSINESS LICENSE BY THE DEFENDANT BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AND TRIAL DE NOVO 
THEREON. 
Jurisdiction over this type of matter is conferred 
upon the District Court by Article VIII,§7 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah, which states: 
The District Court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal not 
excepted in this Constitution, 
and not prohibited by law: 
appellate jurisdiction from all 
courts and tribunals, and a 
supervisory control of the same... 
(emphasis added) 
Section 78-3-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is 
a near ver batim codification of the language of Article 
VIII §7 of the Constitution. 
Rule 81(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, recites: 
"These rules shall apply to the 
practice and procedure in appealing 
from or obtaining a review of any 
order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board of agency, 
insofar as the specific statutory 
•• procedure in connection with any 
such appeal or review is in conflict 
or inconsistent with these rules. 
Which language therefore makes the provisions 
of Rule 57, on declaratory judgments, and Rule 73 on 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appellate procedure applicable to review- of or appeal from 
orders or rulings of the Defendant Board of County 
Commissioners. 
Further authority is granted by §§78-33-1 through 
13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953* to Districts Courts within 
their respective jurisdictions, to declare rights, status, 
and other legal relations between parties, or under statutes 
and ordinances (78-33-2 and 78-33-5) and in addition, 
states that any enumeration of power does not limit or 
restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in 
Section 78-33-1 (78-33-5) and further, states that the 
chapter is to be liberally construed (78-33-12). 
There appears to be no statutory language that 
specifies how an appeal is to be taken from an order of 
a Board of County Commissioners. This situation however 
is analagous to an appeal from a decision of one of the 
Boards of the Department of Business Regulations in which 
a license issued by a branch of the Department of 
Registration is revoked or suspended by that Board's action. 
A case in point is Baker v. Department of Registration et al. 
78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082, which involved revocation by the 
Department of Registration of a physician's license to 
practice. The then existing statute which authorized 
hearings in proceedings to revoke licenses contained therein 
7 
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the statement: "•.•provided that appeal to'the Courts may 
be had..." (Laws 1921c 130 Section 3 sub. f as amended 
laws 1923 c.49 Section 1) Counsel for Appellant and 
Respondent in that case both agreed that because the 
legislature did not provide specifically how an appeal 
should be taken, that therefore an appeal could not be 
taken. The Supreme Court disagreed! The Court said at 
page 1086, 3 P.2d. : 
"...that Courts may not usurp the 
functions of lawmaking powers by 
giving a meaning to its enactments 
where no meaning exists, or by sub-
stituting conjectural interpretation 
for judicial exposition, may readily 
be conceded as applied to substantive 
law, but courts not infrequently are 
required to, and do, adopt rules of 
procedure in furtherance of the exercise 
of both original and appellate juris-
dictions, especially where such 
jurisdiction is conferred by constitu-
tional provisions. If either original 
or appellate jurisdiction is by 
constitutional provisions conferred 
upon a court, the failure of the 
legislature to provide the manner in 
which such jurisdiction shall be 
exercised cannot defeat the jurisdiction 
so conferred." (emphasis added) 
The Court then quotes at length from the California case of 
People v. Jordan, 65 Cal 644, 4 P.683, 684, in which there 
were no provisions at all for an appeal from a criminal 
action of the type in which the Defendant was involved. 
The California Supreme Court created the procedure for an 
appeal saying, 
8 
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"But thfe authority of any -usage is 
derived from its recognition and sanction 
by the Court, and we cannot decline to 
take cognizance of a matter clearly within 
our jurisdiction because the mode of 
procedure applicable to it has not been 
regulated by statute, written rule or 
precedent. In such a case it is our 
duty to create a precedent. ..
 tthe power 
of courts to establish a system of 
procedure by means of which parties may 
seek the exercise of their jurisdiction, 
at least when a system has not been 
established by legislative authority is 
inherent." (emphasis added) 
The Utah Court cites the provision of Article VIII §7 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, noting that the 
district court is given appellate jurisdiction of all 
inferior Courts and tribunals (emphasis added). The 
Court there says at page 1088 Pacific Reporter: 
"...the right to practice medicine is 
a valuable property right, and the 
proceeding to revoke such right is 
essentially the exercise of a judicial 
function. While the Department of 
Registration is primarily an 
administrative body, it exercises 
judicial functions when it under-
takes to hear and determine whether 
or not a license of a physician and 
surgeon shall be revoked. It is, 
while exercising such functions, 
essentially a tribunalT7* (emphasis added) 
It is submitted that the matter at bar is esentially 
the same as the situation in the foregoing case: The Salt 
Lake County Board of County Commissioners, while sitting 
in judgment on a question of license revocation under 
ordinances passed by itself, is sitting as as tribunal. 
A more compelling reason for the propriety of an appeal 
Q Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to the district court from a County Boardf-s decision is 
that the County is sitting as a tribunal in judgment of 
alleged violations of an ordinance enacted by itself 
and has in the enactment of the County Ordinances failed 
to provide for any appeal from its decisions. 
It should here be noted that the District Court, 
in the instant case, has said that in its view, the 
way to proceed is by way of Rule 65B(b)(2) or (b)(4) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Rule 65B(e) says 
in its last sentence "the review by the Court issuing 
the writ shall not be extended further than to determine 
whether the inferior tribunal, board or officer has
 r 
regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board 
or officer." If this is to be done, here we have a 
situation in which the Board of County Commissioners 
enacts ordinances enpowering themselves to do certain 
acts and granting themselves certain jurisdiction and if 
review under Rule 65B is all that is to be allowed, 
then all the reviewing Court can do is to determine whether 
they have adhered to the authority they have granted them-
selves. The actions of the Board of County Commissioners 
then became a closed system, responsible primarily only to 
itself, having decided to assume judicial functions, and 
take penal actions and all without having to adhere to 
rules of evidence or civil procedure, thereby denying those 
10 
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who come before it of due process of law-. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah in Article VIII 
§7 provided that the District Courts have appellate 
jurisdiction over inferior courts and tribunals. The 
Court in Baker, Supra, page 1089, 3 P.2d., says that the 
district courts are courts of general jurisdiction and that 
the Department of Registration is a tribunal of limited 
jurisdiction and therefore a tribunal inferior to the 
district court. It is submitted that when a Board of 
County Commissioners sits as a tribunal it is likewise 
a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and therefore inferior 
to the district Court and the district Court has appellate 
jurisdiction thereover. 
POINT II. UPON TAKING APPEAL TO DISTRICT 
COURT THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL 
DE NOVO. 
The above cited case, Baker v. Department of 
Registration, Supra., and a case of the same nature decided 
a few years later, Moormeister v. Golding, 84 Utah 324, 
establish that appeals may be taken from decisions of 
inferior tribunals to district courts and liken such . 
appeals to appeals taken from Justice Courts to District 
Courts. Moormeister (supra) extends the Baker statement 
of the appeal and further likens such an appeal to one 
from a Justice Court to a District Court by saying that 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the effect of the appeal is to grant the appellant a 
trial de novo in District Court (page 3^2, 84 Utah Reports) 
and that "the general rule is, unless otherwise provided 
by statute, that an appeal, where the case is triable 
de novo, vacates the judgment appealed from." 
POINT III. THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE 
HEARD THE QUESTION OP THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' ORDINANCE. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant was in the position of 
having the penal sanctions of the revised ordinance 
enforced against her, so the question of the constitution-
ality and propriety of the ordinance was ripe for 
adjudication. A controversy existed as soon as the Defendant 
Board gave the Plaintiff notice that she would be required 
to show cause why her business license should not be 
revoked. As the Court has said in Clayton v. Bennett, 
5 Utah 2d. 152, 15^ 298 P.2d 531: 
"We are not in disagreement with 
the first three propositions Plaintiff 
asserts: (1) That the Defendant 
Department of Business Regulation, 
as an administrative agency, does not 
determine the constitutionality of 
statutes, (2) that declaratory 
judgment coupled with injunctive 
procedure is a correct method of 
challenging the constitutionality 
of the statutes upon which Defendant 
relies for its authority, (3) that 
the right to engage in a profession 
is a property right which is entitled 
to protection by the law and the 
Courts." (emphasis added). 
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Irrespective of whether the District Court 
agreed or disagreed with the Plaintifffs request for an 
appealj the constitutionality of the Defendant's ordinance 
was challenged properly and therefore ripe for adjudication, 
and s-hould have been placed in issue and decided. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff's Complaint clearly stated a cause 
of action on the constitutional issue and under the 
doctrine of Clayton v. Bennett (Supra), the issue should 
have been heard. 
As has previously been argued, an aggrieved party 
must have the right to appeal a decision of a Board of 
County Commissioners sitting as a tribunal in order that 
he be allowed due process. This right of appeal includes 
the right to a bona fide adversary proceeding in a trial 
de novo to assure protection of the aggrieved party's 
constitutional rights. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
g^day of March, 1976. 
'Q^LJJL&A^ 
b< KENDALL PERKINS ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 359-7756 
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